Indiana Law Journal
Volume 38

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1962

Federal District Court Consolidation Orders and the Final
Judgment Rule

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
(1962) "Federal District Court Consolidation Orders and the Final Judgment Rule," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 38 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol38/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the General Assembly could be given the power to make whatever provisions it deems necessary to secure the equitable taxation of property.7
Whichever course is chosen, the action should be instituted at the 1963
session of the Indiana General Assembly. 7' Until article X, section 1 is
amended, the validity of many statutes is uncertain and the General Assembly's hands are effectively tied, at a time when productivity and
equity in the property tax are desperately needed."2

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CONSOLIDATION ORDERS AND
THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal judge, at his discretion, to order a joint hearing or trial when matters
in issue, in different actions, involve a common question of law or fact.
Such an order is called a consolidation order and has as its avowed purpose the avoidance of unnecessary costs or delay. Although not subject
to immediate appeal within the meaning of section 1291 of the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Code of 1948, there is substantial conflict among
the courts of appeal as to whether exceptional circumstances warrant an
appeal before a final judgment.' This conflict was most recently recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kelly v. Greer"
where the appellant contested the validity of a consolidation order made
by the district court judge on the motion of the plaintiff. The appellate
court indicated that while some circuits had allowed immediate appellate
70. Such a bill was introduced at the 1961 General Assembly. S.J.Res. 7, 92d
Indiana General Assembly (1961). It passed the senate but was never reported out of
the House Judiciary A Committee.
71. An amendment to article VI, § 11 of the Indiana constitution passed the 92d
General Assembly in 1961. According to article XVI, § 2 of the constitution, no new
amendment can be introduced while one is pending. If, however, the pending one is
rejected by the 93d General Assembly, new ones could be introduced at that session.
72. There have been some indications that such an amendment would receive support in the 93d General Assembly. The 1962 Indiana Republican Platform, section on
Tax Reforms and Repeal says: "We advocate an end to the unjust, confused and expensive assessment of household goods." The Marion County Republican candidates for
the General Assembly have said that they will campaign on a platform calling for the
elimination of the household personal property tax. Indianapolis Times, August 1,
1962, p. 15, cols. 3-5.
1. On appeal, the injury normally complained of is that the consolidation has
either caused confusion to the jury or prejudiced the complainant's cause. See Williams v. National Sur. Corp., 257 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Knauer,
149 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) ; Polito v. Molarsky, 123 F.2d
258 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 315 U.S. 804 (1942) ; Associated Indem. Corp. v. Davis,
51 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Pa. 1943).
2. 295 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1961).

NOTES
review on the grounds that the order was subject to the collateral order
doctrin& or that extraordinary circumstances were involved,4 two circuits had held a consolidation order was not immediately reviewable because such an order was not a final judgment.5 The court in the Kelly
case decided, however, that it did not have to pass upon the question of
whether a consolidation order was immediately appealable, because in
granting the order the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion.
The practical effect of the Kelly case was to permit an immediate appellate review of a consolidation order, but the court leaves to supposition
the grounds upon which the order was considered to be immediately reviewable. In short, the court only added to the already existing conflict
and further emphasized the need of a critical investigation of the merits
and the methods of immediate appellate review of district court consolidation orders.
FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW POLICY

A necessary antecedent to an investigation of the problem of immediate appellate review of consolidation orders is to consider the overall
federal appellate review policy, since presumably any resolution of the
consolidation problems should be consistent with that policy.
The federal courts and Congress have long had a policy against permitting piecemeal appeals.' Such appeals have the effect of taxing already overcrowded federal court dockets and of unnecessarily extending
litigation. There exists, for instance, the possibility that the claim of
error may be rendered moot by (1) the eventual determination of the
action in favor of the claimant or (2) the settlement of the dispute out
of court before a final judgment can be rendered. Added to these possible eventualities is the fact that errors which seem important at an early
stage of litigation often-times seem trivial in light of the final decision."
Finally, there is the very real possibility that the appeal may be undertaken, not on its merits, but as a dilatory tactic interposed for the purpose
of delay. The combination of these factors-added time, unnecessary
expense, possible mootness and the potential use of the appeal as a dilatory
3. See MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958).
4. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1932); Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828 (8th Cir. 1920).
5. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 276 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1960);
Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944).
6. See Panicella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 454 (3d Cir. 1958).
7. In discussing the final judgment doctrine, Judge Frank declared, "The philosophy behind this practice is that many mistakes, apparently important at the time will be
seen to be trivial from the perspective of a final disposition of the case, and that disputes will, therefore, be more expeditiously settled [by requiring a final judgment]."
Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1942) (dictum).
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tactic-dictated that a policy against piecemeal appeals be adopted if judicial review was to be efficient.'
Congress supplied the requisite policy in section 1291 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code of 1,948: "The courts of appeals shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States. . .

."

(Emphasis added.) 9 Referred to as the

final judgment rule or the doctrine of finality, section 1291 imposes a
jurisdictional limitation on the courts of appeal by restricting them to
appeals from final judgments only. The effect of this doctrine of finality is to combine in one judicial review all questions of the district
court proceedings that may be effectively reviewed.' The court of appeals is thus able to review the trial proceedings as a whole and the possibility that a decision will result in an abstract declaration is virtually
eliminated."
The final judgment rule, however, has been subjected to vigorous
criticism, 2 the essence of which concerns the wasteful formality of the
final judgment rule and the possible irreparable injury to a litigant who
must await a final judgment until he can appeal.'" In many instances
time and expense are not saved. For example, immediate appellate review of an order which is not a final judgment may end the litigation
or prevent a later reversal and a new trial. Consequently, there are
situations when the final judgment rule actually extends litigation.
Statutory and judicial recognition of some of these problems is evident
in the availability of immediate appellate review of certain orders which
cannot ordinarily be classified as final judgments. Included in this
category are certain interlocutory orders 4 and judgments upon multiple
8. ". . . [J]udicial review must not be leaden footed. Its momentum must not be
arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified cause."
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (dictum).
9. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for
the District of the Canal Zone, the Disrict Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
10. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
11. Taylor v. Board of Education, 288 F.2d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1961) (dictum).
12. See Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis of Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 (1932);
58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949).
13. E.g., in Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1961), on a petition for a writ of mandamus, the court held that an order to disclose
a secret formula in discovery proceedings was an abuse of discretion. The court noted
that compliance with this order would destroy the value of the secret formula and this
could not be remedied on appeal from a final judgment.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958).

NOTES
claims.'" Moreover, the courts have broadened the concept of finality"6
and liberalized the granting of extraordinary writs in an attempt to al17
leviate some of the harshness of the finality rule.
TREATMENT OF CONSOLIDATION AS A FINAL JUDGMENT

Adler v. Seainan,' the initial attempt to obtain immediate appellate
review of a consolidation order, was allowed on the grounds that the
particular order amounted to a final judgment. The Adler case was a
consolidation of two different actions against the same defendant. In
the first suit, Seaman had brought a derivative action asking for recovery of wasted sums and removal of the defendant corporation's directors. In a second suit, Adler filed a bill in equity praying for the court
to place the defendant in the Seaman derivative suit in receivership. After a receiver had been appointed in the Adler equity suit, the parties in
the Seaman derivative suit filed motions in both suits praying for consolidation and that the Adler equity suit be treated as an intervention in
the Seaman derivative suit. Adler appealed from an order granting
these motions.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that the
purpose of these motions was to secure an intervention of the Adler
equity suit in the Seaman derivative suit, making the Adler suit ancillary
and supplemental to the existing litigation. The fact that the receiver
already appointed in the Adler equity suit could qualify in the Seaman
derivative suit was held by the court to be an insufficient basis for consolidation.2 ' The court acknowledged that consolidation orders were
not ordinarily appealable until a final judgment had been rendered. The
order in this case, however, did not leave the Adler equity suit as an independent suit but subordinated it as an intervention in the Seaman deriv15. See

FED.

R. Civ. P. 54(b).

16. See MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Adler v. Seaman, 266
Fed. 828 (8th Cir. 1920).
17. See United Airlines Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961); American
Pac. Prod. v. Dist. of Guam, 217 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1955).
18. 266 Fed. 828 (8th Cir. 1920).
19. Consolidation was allowed by Rev. Stat. § 921 (1875) which provided:
When causes of a like nature or relative to the same question are pending
before a Court of the United States, or of any Territory, the court may make
such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable
to the usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice and may consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable
to do so.
20. Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828, 837 (8th Cir. 1920). Consolidated actions
should preserve their separate identity and are not merged into a single action. Greenberg v. Gianini, 140 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1944) ; National Nut Co. of California v. Susu
Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 86 (D.C. Ill. 1944); United States v. Bregler, 3 F.D.R. 378

(D.C.N.Y. 1944).
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ative suit. The order took from Adler the control of his own litigation
and made his suit dependent on the success of other litigation. A review
after a final decision, in the opinion of the court, would not have been an
adequate remedy for Adler, because in the meantime the receiver would
have wasted assets to which Adler was entitled. 2 The court therefore
allowed immediate appellate review, notwithstanding the doctrine of
finality.
The Adler case is the only case in which the final judgment argument, as such, has been presented. Although theoretically it is no violation of the policy against piecemeal appeals to allow immediate appellate
review of an order which qualifies as a final judgment, it is contended
that considering a consolidation order as a final judgment because of
irreparable injury is a judicial fiction 2 which opens the door to piecemeal
appellate review by the mere allegation of irreparable injury. The doctrinal weakness of the Adler case, however, is probably not the reason
that the Adler final judgment doctrine has remained unused. The most
plausible rationale is that later courts did not need to rely on Adler because they could accomplish the same result with the collateral order
doctrine. In fact, it could be argued that the Adler case was nothing
more than a primitive application of the contemporary collateral order
doctrine. The Adler case irrespective of any of its weaknesses, however,
does illustrate that where irreparable injury results from the grant or
denial of a consolidation order there is need for a provision enabling an
immediate appellate review of the order.
IMMEDIATE REVIEW THROUGH THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE"

Although the collateral order doctrine existed before 1949, in that
year a definitive standard was established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial,Loan Corp.24 The plaintiff in the Cohen case brought a derivative
stockholder's suit. A state statute provided that plaintiffs in such actions
may be required to give security for reasonable expenses of the defendant
if they do not represent a given interest in the corporation. The defendant moved to require security and the district court denied the motion on the grounds that the state statute was procedural, not substantive,
21.

Adler v. Seaman, supra note 20, at 840.

22. Generally an order granting or denying consolidation is treated as an interlocutory order. See Whiteman v. Petrie, 220 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; Sk-irvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944) (dictum). See generally 2B BARRON &
HoLTzonF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 179 (Rev. ed. 1961).

23. See generally 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 54.14 (2d ed. 1958) ; Underwood,
Appeals in the Federal Practice from Collateral Orders, 36 VA. L. REv. 731 (1950) ; 51
Nw. U.L. Ray. 751 (1957).

24. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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hence the federal court need not apply state law in this diversity suit.
The Supreme Court recognized that this order was not ordinarily appealable,2" but held that an order which is a final disposition of a collateral claim of right, not an ingredient of the cause of action, 2 and
which would not be considered on appeal from a final judgment, is
immediately reviewable. 7
The collateral right in the Cohen case was the right of the defendant
to have plaintiff post security before plaintiff could bring his suit. This
was a valuable interest to the defendant granted by statute, and the denial of the right was given the dignity of a final judgment which the
court would immediately review. Similar treatment has been given to
an order vacating attachment or garnishment," an order denying a motion to reduce bail,2" an order dismissing a petition for supplemental attorney's fees and for liens to secure payment thereof3" and an order
directing that notice of a tax lien be cancelled and a supersedeas bond be
approved in lieu thereof." These orders terminated a collateral proceeding and were treated as final judgments within the final judgment provision, section 1291.2

In MacAlister v. Guterma,33 a derivative stockholder's action for
breach of fiduciary duty was brought in three separate actions. A re25. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 546:
This decision appears to fall into that small class which finally determine

claims of right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,

too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to

require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. . . . This order is appealable because it is a final disposition of a
claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not
require consideration with it.
27. "[The order] did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of
the case and will not be merged in final judgment. When the time comes for review it
will be too late to effectively review and the right conferred by the statute [if it is

applicable] will have been lost, probably irreparably." Ibid.
28. See Swift and Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(1950) ; contra, Cushing v. Laird, 107 U.S. 69 (1882) (where an attachment or garnishment in a quasi in rem action was upheld pending a final determination on the merits).
29. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1950).
30. See Preston v. United States, 284 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1960).
31. See Tomlinson v. Poller, 220 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1956).
32. See generally Underwood, Appeals in the Federal Practice from Collateral
Orders,36 VA. L. Rav. 731, 736 (1950) where the author states:

Final decisions as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948) most often mean the decision terminating the litigation; but as we have seen, the term also covers orders
which are collateral, but which are irreparable in their effect upon the rights
of some party. Such an order is, in a sense, a separate proceeding and a litigation in itself. The order may initiate that particular constructive proceeding,
but in any event the order also terminates it, and therefore is a final decision
and falls within § 1291.
33. 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958).
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quest for consolidation of the actions for all purposes, including the pretrial stages, was included in the preliminary motions of the defendant.
The district judge denied consolidation of the actions for pre-trial, and
this was one of the orders appealed from by the defendant who contended
that pre-trial consolidation was proper and that the denial was an abuse
of discretion. After presenting the test in the Cohen case,84 the appellate
court stated that,
The finality required by statute has therefore been judicially
qualified to mean, not only decisions terminating litigation, but
also orders which are collateral and which are irreparable in
their effect upon the rights of some party. 8
The court in the MacAlister case noted that the question of whether
denial of pre-trial consolidation was of the same character as orders reviewable under the collateral order doctrine was difficult and, therefore,
it was not attempting to prescribe a universal rule for consolidation
orders but the court felt the particular order met the Cohen collateral
order test. 6 The court of appeals, however, affirmed the district court
decision pointing out that the district court judge had exercised proper
discretion in denying the motion since it was too early to determine if
failure to consolidate would cause the duplication and confusion the defendant wished to avoid by his consolidation motion. 7
The reasoning of the MacAlister case leaves unanswered some basic
questions concerning the application of the collateral order doctrine to
district court consolidation decisions. The court fails to identify the
collateral claim of right that was established by a denial of pre-trial consolidation.
Is the collateral right the right to pre-trial consolidation, or
is it more basic than that, i.e., a right to avoid duplication and confusion?
In the Cohen case posting security for defendant's expenses was a substantive matter outside the scope of the main litigation, based on a right
conferred by a statute. The federal rule 42(a) consolidation provision,
however, is merely a procedural step in the conduct of a trial and is not
a right since the grant or denial of consolidation is a matter of discretion
with the trial judge. Therefore, it would appear that this denial of consolidation was not reviewable as a collateral order. Recent decisions,
34. See note 26 supra.
35. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1958).

36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 70.
38. The court explicitly states, "A denial of the consolidation sought bears no relation to the substantive claims in the case, is collateral thereto and is not merged in
the final judgment," without any previous discussion as to why this conclusion is true.
Id. at 67.

NOTES
however, indicate that the courts may be adopting a more liberal attitude
in relation to the concept of the claim of right, thereby expanding the
application of the Cohen collateral order test. 9 Although it is too early
to determine if all the courts are going to adopt the more liberal attitude,
it is contended that there may be some danger that a broad application of
the collateral order doctrine would, in effect, destroy the policy against
piecemeal appeals, since a litigant could conceivably argue that any ruling
adverse to him is a collateral claim of right, hence subject to immediate
appellate review.
IMMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEV OF A CONSOLIDATION ORDER AS AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER40

Since it appears that use of the collateral order doctrine final judgment rationale for immediate appellate review of consolidation orders
will open the door to piecemeal review, the remaining alternative is to
consider a consolidation order as an interlocutory order and reviewable
as such.
Answering a call" for some type of relief from the harshness of

section 1291, the final judgment provision, Congress amended section
1292,42 the interlocutory order statute by adding:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such an order involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon in its discretion permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the
entry of the order; provided, however, that application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court
39. See Harmar Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 239 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1956) (an order denying a motion to disqualify attorneys); Weilbocher v. J. H.
Winchester Co., 197 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1952) (an order vacating a court approved stipulation dismissing an appeal).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958), dealing with a limited number of interlocutory
orders and 28 U.S.C. § 54(b) (1958), dealing with multiple parties and multiple claims
would ordinarily not be applicable to a normal interlocutory consolidation order. However, if such an order had an effect other than consolidation, i.e., accomplishing the
purposes of receivership or determining rights of parties in admiralty cases, then §
1292(a) would be used.
41. See generally 58 COLUtn. L. Rxv. 1306 (1958); 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1948).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958).
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unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.4
In order to obtain immediate appellate review of an interlocutory
order by the district judge, the order must involve a controlling question
of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion.44 Legislative history indicates that to be a controlling question
of law, the legal question must be of the type that would, if decided, terAlthough some
minate the litigation in the favor of the appellant.'
46
courts have accepted this test, the majority of the courts have rejected
it and define a controlling question of law as any central question of
law, not settled by controlling authority.47 Even though there is conflict
as to the definition of a controlling question of law, it appears that the
courts are somewhat hostile to considering a discretionary order question
as a controlling question of law under either definition.4" Since an order
pursuant to the federal rule 42(a) consolidation provision is a matter
of discretion with the district judge it appears that such an order would
not be immediately reviewable under section 1292(b)."
However, in a recent case, United Airlines Inc. v. Wiener," jurisdiction to review the denial of a consolidation order under federal rule
42(a) was based on section 1292(b). In the United Airlines case,
twenty-three actions were brought as a result of a collision between
appellant's airplane and an airplane owned by the United States government. The United States made a motion for consolidation on the issue
of liability and United Airlines filed a motion for consolidation on all
the issues. The district court granted consolidation on the issue of liability only and United Airlines appealed. The court of appeals did not
discuss whether the provisions of section 1292 (b) had been satisfied but
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). See generally 47 GEo. L.J. 474 (1959) ; 72 HARV.
584 (1959).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
45. S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958).
46. See Berger v. United States 170 F. Supp. 795, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) where
the judge stated, "I rest my decision, however, on the fact that there is not enough likelihood of success upon the appeal to warrant the exercise of my discretion in expediting it."
47. See, e.g., In. re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Cordero v. Panama
Canal Co. 170 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Orzulak v. Federal Commerce & Nay.

L.

43.

REV.

Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958)

48. See United States v. Woodburry, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Seven-Up Co.
v. O-So Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Ili. 1959); Deepwater Exploration Co. v.
Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. La 1958).
49. The second requirement, that the immediate appeal will materially advance the
litigation has been strictly required and an appeal will be denied if it cannot materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Krock v. Texas Co., 167 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y.

1958).
50. 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961).
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merely stated that jurisdiction was based on section 1292 (b)." In effect, the court allowed an appeal based on the trial judge's denial of consolidation, a discretionary order which had not been previously cited as
the type of controlling question of law which was appealable. 2 There
has been no indication whether the courts of appeal will follow the United
Airlines case and allow a discretionary order to be immediately reviewed;
however, the previous conservative practice of not allowing immediate
appellate review of discretionary orders would indicate that this case may
not be followed by the other circuits and the controlling question of law
will have to be more than a discretionary order.
I-MMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEW THROUGH
WRIT OF MANDAMUS

THE USE OF THE

"3

A brief note should be made of another method of obtaining immediate appellate review of consolidation orders. Section 1651, referred
to as the all writs statute, allows the appellate courts to issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their jurisdiction. 4 One of these, the
writ of mandamus, has traditionally been used to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, or to compel it
to exercise its authority where it has a duty to do so." There has been,
however, an increase in the use of the petition for the writ of mandamus
to effectuate immediate appellate review of a district judge's discretionary order, otherwise not reviewable until after a final judgment. Among
those interlocutory orders reviewed by the petition for a writ of mandamus are: an order of reference to a master, "6 an order directing oral
discovery in admiralty,"7 a transfer order whereby venue is changed58
51. Id. at 304.
52. See note 48 supra, and accompanying text.
53. See generally 50 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1102 (1950) ; 4 DE PAUL L. REv. 279 (1955);
75 HAnv. L. REv. 351, 375 (1962) ; 6 KAx. L. REv. 78 (1957).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
55. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21, 16 (1941) (dictum):
The traditional use of the writ of mandamus in aid of appellate jurisdiction
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it has a duty to do so; and even in such cases appellate
courts are reluctant to interfere with the decision of a lower court on jurisdictional questions which it was competent to decide and which are reviewable
in the regular course of appeal.
56. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); In re Watkins, 271
F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
57. See Atlass v. Miner, 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959) aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
58. See Hotel Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 283 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1960);
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan,
182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950). In regard to transfer orders, the 1st and 3rd circuits
have voiced strong opposition to the use of mandamus as a means of obtaining immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders. See In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 144 (1st Cir.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

and a discovery order.5" Use of this means of obtaining appellate review
appears to be subject only to the limitation that no other means to obtain
immediate appellate review is available."0
The use of the petition for the writ of mandamus as a method of
obtaining immediate appellate review of consolidation orders was foreseen in 19321 and mandamus was finally used in American PacificProd.
v. District of Guam. 2 In the American Pacific case, a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the district court to separate a consolidated
action. Although the court ruled that a grant of mandamus was not
proper because complainant had not shown any prejudice to his cause
because of consolidation, the court, in effect, allowed immediate appellate review, through the petition for mandamus, of the district court's
consolidation order. The American Pacific court did not discuss
whether a mandamus proceeding was proper, but in the recent Kelly
case," where the multiple methods of obtaining immediate appellate review of consolidation orders were discussed, the court indicated that the
American Pacific holding might be inconsistent with the proposition that
a mandamus proceeding cannot be used to test the correctness of a district court's interlocutory order. 4 This statement indicates the use of
the extraordinary writ as a means of immediate appellate review has not
been well received by all the courts of appeal. The American Pacific
case is an expansion of the ordinary application of the petition for the
writ, but the trend away from the traditional use of mandamus has
neither been held applicable to all interlocutory orders, nor do all the
courts, irrespective of the situation before the court, follow a liberal
practice of allowing immediate appellate review through the use of the
1954) ; All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1952). See generally
36 IND. L.J. 344, 357 (1960) ; 6 KAN. L. Ray. 38 (1957).
59. See Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961),
where the court explicitly recognized that no jurisdictional question was involved but
because of an abuse of discretion plus an inquiry that could not be corrected on appeal,
the writ was granted.
60. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 264 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1959), the
court found no extraordinary circumstances that would justify the issuance of the writ of
mandamus since petitioner had made no showing of having sought relief under § 1292(b).
61. A consolidation order was reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment. In
discussing the appealability and effects of a consolidation order if a final judgment was
not being reviewed, Judge Hand noted, "In such circumstances, in order to prevent the
defeat of our appellate jurisdiction, we may have recourse to the writs appropriate to
that situation." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934, 940 (2d Cir. 1932), aff'd
289 U.S. 479 (consolidation not reviewed).
62. 217 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1955).
63. Kelly v. Greer, 295 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1961).
64. See Regec v. Thornton, 275 F.2d 801 (6th Cir. 1960). It should be noted that
in the Avierican Pacific case, the majority did not adopt Judge Pope's concurring opinion
that the petition failed to state the requested writ would be in aid of the appellate court's
jurisdiction.

NOTES
petition." Therefore, a general statement concerning the mandamus
method of immediate appellate review of consolidation orders cannot be
made until the courts of appeal consider more cases in which the use of
the petition is involved. There is, however, sentiment that the use of
mandamus as a means of obtaining immediate appellate review will not
be expanded68 and perhaps section 1292 (b), the recent amendment to the
interlocutory order provision, obviates the need of the expansion of the
writ of mandamus to obtain immediate appellate review of interlocutory
orders.
CONCLUSION

Against the background of the policy against piecemeal review, the
practical aspects of each fact situation must be considered in determining whether a consolidation order should be immediately reviewed. 7 The
courts in allowing review seem to recognize the potential injury to a
litigant who is not allowed immediate appellate review, but there is no
uniformity as to which is the best method, and some of the methods being used foreshadow the danger of increased piecemeal review by a mere
allegation of irreparable injury; namely, allowing immediate appellate
review through an expansion of the use of the writ of mandamus,
broadening the collateral order doctrine, and defining consolidation order
in terms of a final judgment. If the interlocutory order statute, section
1292 (b), is to be used for immediate appellate review, a clear expansion
of the controlling question of law criterion will be required. The fact
that none of these methods is clearly applicable to a consolidation
may indicate it is not the type of interlocutory order which should be
immediately reviewed, but this would be a harsh treatment since reversal
of discretionary orders after a final judgment is rare.68 Also, uniform
65.

See note 58 supra.

66. See generally 75 Hmv. L. REv. 351, 377-378 (1961).
67. ". . the concept of finality as a condition of review has encountered situations
which make clear that it need not invite self-defeating judicial construction." Dibella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121, 125 (1962) (dictum).
68. As one district judge said, "And judicial precedent is legion which suggests
that the likelihood of successfully urging an abuse of discretion in an appellate court is
comparable to the chance which an ice cube would have of retaining its obese proportions while floating in a pot of boiling water." Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 179
F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (dictum). Only two early cases held that the consolidation was an abuse of discretion. Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828 (8th Cir. 1920) ;
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1932). Since these two cases,
research disclosed no cases in which abuse of discretion in granting or denying consolidation orders was found. See, e.g., North Carolina Natural Gas Corp. v. Seaboard
Sur. Co. 284 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Knauer, 149 F.2d 519 (7th Cir.
1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 653 (1946) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Saxe, 134 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. den. 319 U.S. 745; Polito v. Molasky, 123 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.
1941), cert. den. 315 U.S. 804 (1942).
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denial of immediate appellate review of consolidation orders ignores the
practical consideration of the irreparable injury of some consolidation
orders. Although this irreparable injury has not been found in many
cases, this certainly does not preclude a future litigant from attempting
to have an order pursuant to the federal rule 42 (a) consolidation provision reversed, if he has, in fact, suffered an injury. Therefore, it would
seem that immediate appellate review should be allowed for consolidation
orders which, because of an abuse of discretion, cause irreparable injury.
The obvious problem is to determine which method of obtaining immediate appellate review is best, without opening a floodgate of piecemeal review.
It would appear that the most practical way to provide for immediate appellate review would be to expand the controlling question of law
standard of the interlocutory order statute, section 1292(b), to include
discretionary orders of the trial court. Use of this method of appeal is
most consistent with the objectives of the doctrine of finality in that the
statute itself prevents the use of appeal as a dilatory tactic because (1) a
review pursuant to section 1292 (b) does not stay proceedings in the trial
court and (2) the court of appeals has the discretion to permit or deny
immediate appeal. Moreover, this method of allowing immediate appellate review would relieve the appellate court of straining logic to find
a final judgment and allow the courts to limit the expansion of the petition for the writ of mandamus.

